Ought we prevent preventable evils?

• Autores: Charles B. Daniels
• Localización: Disputatio, ISSN-e 0873-626X, Vol. 1, Nº. 20, 2006, págs. 1-12
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • In Practical Ethics Peter Singer argues for an �obligation to assist�:

    First premise: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it.

    Second premise: Absolute poverty is bad.

    Third premise: There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.

    Conclusion: We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

    This paper is dedicated to a criticism of four readings of the first premise and an undesirable link the first premise has with the third. The paper ends by offering a alternative formulation of an �obligation to assist,� which suffers from none of these problems.