The essay starts by examining the content and by proposing a “historicisation” of the fundamental decision no. 9/1959, by which the Constitutional Court sets out the limits of its own review of legislative proceedings. After mentioning three decisions (namely, no. 78/1984, on the calculation of abstentions; no.
391/1995, on confidence votes; no. 246/2010, on the passage of municipalities from one Region to another), the article analyses how the Constitutional Court in its subsequent case-law has actually avoided exercising the role it had originally marked out for itself in 1959, as interpreter and guardian of the constitutional provisions on legislative proceedings. The denial of this kind of review has had negative impacts on today’s parliamentary form of government, which has abandoned a proportional electoral system in favour of a majoritarian one, and where the role of the Speakers of the two Houses has profoundly changed.
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