Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited

• Autores: Sarah A. Binder
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 31, N. 4, 2006, págs. 513-532
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median-voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median-voter model may be time-bound to the twentieth century�after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.