Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures

• Autores: James R. Rogers
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 30, N. 1, 2005, págs. 29-42
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this �first-mover advantage� implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.