Minority Rights and Majority Power: Conditional Party Government and the Motion to Recommit in the House

• Autores: Jason M. Roberts
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 30, N. 2, 2005, págs. 219-234
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Students of legislative politics have struggled to explain and measure party influence on voting and outcomes in Congress. Proponents of strong party effects point to the numerous procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority party as evidence of party effects, yet recent theoretical work by Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002) argues that House rules guaranteeing the minority a motion to recommit with instructions effectively balances the procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority. This article identifies and tests the empirical implications of the Krehbiel and Meirowitz theory, using roll-call data from the 61st to 107th Congresses (1909�2002). The results call into question the validity of Krehbiel and Meirowitz's conclusions about party government in the House and provide support for the theory of conditional party government.