Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign

• Autores: Eric S. Heberlig, Bruce A. Larson
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 30, N. 4, 2005, págs. 597-624
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.