Bicameralism and Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate

• Autores: Frances E. Lee
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 29, N. 2, 2004, págs. 185-213
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Because they represent different kinds of constituencies�states versus parts of states�senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools�earmarks and narrow categorical programs�that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House-Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.