Congressional Vote Options

• Autores: David C. King, Richard J. Zeckhauser
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 28, N. 3, 2003, págs. 387-411
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure �hip-pocket votes� or �if you need me� pledges from rank-and-file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options�pay legislators to convert to favorable votes�when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non-key votes from the 106th Congress (1999�2000).