This article examines the tendency of many historians of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British military to be dismissive of both the potential for cavalry action on the battlefield and the capacity of the mounted arm to reform. This tendency is rooted in an overemphasis on the impact and effectiveness of new weapons technologies. By drawing not just on historiographical evidence but also on the works of contemporary theorists, a case is made that the supposedly reactionary adherents of the arme blanche proved, in fact, the most practical reformers, creating an arm capable of fighting effectively both mounted and dismounted. Their doctrine was vindicated during the First World War; neither the sometimes confused posturing of the advocates of mounted infantry nor the advent of the clumsy and unreliable tank provided a genuine alternative to the highly mobile and tactically flexible British cavalry arm. Overall, this case might serve as a warning against prioritizing technologically based explanations of changes in the conduct of warfare.
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