Symposium on Writing the Book of the World*

• Autores: Theodore Sider
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 73, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 751-770
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • 1. Reply to Gabriele Contessa Gabriele Contessa concludes his fine paper by saying that although he rejects my strong form of realism about structure, he accepts a weak form:

    Strong structure realism is what I take Sider to be advocating in Writing the Book of the World � it is the view that we do not just need to be realist about what the individual components of the world�s fundamental structure are (which might include, depending on one�s metaphysical views, universals or bare particulars or what-have-you) but also about the world�s structure itself. Weak structure realism, on the other hand, is simply the thesis that the world has one structure (as opposed to none or many), a thesis whose denial leads to various forms of metaphysical pluralism or metaphysical anti-realism. Weak structure realism takes �structure� to be just a placeholder for whatever the world contains at the fundamental metaphysical level (as opposed to something one can be genuinely realist about).

    But in fact, with one exception, Contessa and I disagree on little.

    For instance, Contessa�s definitions above of both weak and strong structure realism use the terms �structure� and �fundamental�, apparently presupposing that such terms are in good standing. But establishing this was in effect the main point of my book. Further, the strong structure realism that Contessa attributes to me is distinguished by its realism �about structure itself�; but I don�t think of �the world�s structure� as some sort of object or fact over and above facts about this or that concept carving at the joints � facts that Contessa apparently accepts.

    We do disagree over whether structure applies to logical notions. Regarding my defence of Lewis�s �reference magnetism� reply to certain forms of semantic scepticism (section 3.2), Contessa says:

    I doubt that reference magnetism is a cure-all for all forms of semantic �