Rational Probabilistic Incoherence

• Autores: Michael Caie
• Localización: Philosophical Review, ISSN-e 1558-1470, Vol. 122, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 527-575
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain cases, the goal of having accurate credences is best served by being probabilistically incoherent. Assuming that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that are as accurate as possible, it follows that in certain cases a rational agent ought to have probabilistically incoherent credences.