Presupposition, Disagreement, and Predicates of Taste

• Autores: Josh Parsons
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 113, Nº. 2 (pt2), 2013, págs. 163-173
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalization gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is required by leading theories on predicates of taste.