Non-Inferentialism about Justification � The Case of Aesthetic Judgements

• Autores: Fabian Dorsch
• Localización: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN-e 1467-9213, Vol. 63, Nº. 253, 2013, págs. 660-682
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements � that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony � are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to only some of their lower-level features that realise their higher-level aesthetic qualities. Although my concern with the view that aesthetic judgements are subject to non-inferential justification is very general, my discussion is primarily structured around Sibley's well-developed and influential version of this view.