Real representation of fictional objects

• Autores: Luke Manning
• Localización: Journal of aesthetics & art criticism, ISSN-e 1540-6245, ISSN 0021-8529, Vol. 72, Nº 1, 2014, págs. 13-24
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Assuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented�appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments for this unexpected conclusion; they concern the semantics of names, pragmatic force, creation, and representations� qualitative content. But I find all the arguments flawed. I then argue for the contrary, employing a new perspective: representation of fictional objects begins with the works of fiction that originate them. A work of fiction represents its �native� objects because our culture bestows that property on it (and on other works of fiction). I sketch conditions for such property bestowal and argue that they are satisfied in this case.