Is Federalism a Political Safety Valve?: Evidence from Congressional Decision Making, 1960-2005

• Autores: Sara Chatfield, Philip Rocco
• Localización: Publius: the journal of federalism, ISSN 0048-5950, Vol. 44, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 1-23
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • American federalism is often described as a system that contains "political safety valves," or institutional mechanisms that ensure that major policy reforms can be created, even during periods of intense political conflict. By granting discretion to the states, for example, scholars claim that Congress can ensure that diverse constituencies receive their preferred policies. In this article, we examine Congress's pattern of delegating discretion to sub-national institutions in the postwar period, systematically assessing how the political conditions under which a broad sample of landmark legislation passed are related to the delegation of administrative authority to the states. Contrary to the "safety valve" image of federalism, we find very little evidence to suggest that Congress grants more discretion to sub-national governments under periods of intense political conflict.