Semantic paradox and alethic undecidability

• Autores: Stephen Barker
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 74, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 201-209
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious revenge.