Stable matching with incomplete information

• Autores: Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson
• Localización: Econométrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, ISSN 0012-9682, Vol. 82, Nº 2, 2014, págs. 541-587
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price-sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete-information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.