Modelling science as a contribution good

• Autores: Terence Kealey, Martin Ricketts
• Localización: Research Policy, ISSN-e 1873-7625, Vol. 43, Nº. 6, 2014, págs. 1014-1024
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The non-rivalness of scientific knowledge has traditionally underpinned its status as a public good. In contrast we model science as a contribution game in which spillovers differentially benefit contributors over non-contributors. This turns the game of science from a prisoner's dilemma into a game of �pure coordination�, and from a �public good� into a �contribution good�. It redirects attention from the �free riding� problem to the �critical mass� problem. The �contribution good� specification suggests several areas for further research in the new economics of science and provides a modified analytical framework for approaching public policy.