Resumen de Optimal auction design in two-sided markets
A previous version of this article circulated with the title �Mechanism Design in Two-Sided Markets: Auctioning Users.� I am grateful to the editor, Mark Armstrong, and two anonymous referees for very helpful and detailed comments. I would like to thank my doctoral committee, Alessandro Pavan, Marco Ottaviani, Rakesh Vohra, and William Rogerson for their support and encouragement, as well as Jacques Crémer, Yassine Lefouili, Carlos Madeira, Shiran Rachmilevitch, James Schummer, Ron Siegel, Michael Whinston, and Asher Wolinsky for very helpful conversations. I benefited from discussions at seminars and conferences at Northwestern, Cornell, Bonn, Maastricht, MIT Sloan, Arizona State, Boston University, Toulouse, Bocconi, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Puc-Rio, ZEW Conference on Platform Markets 2010, Econometric Society World Congress 2010, and INTERTIC 2010. The usual disclaimer applies.
