Simultaneous vs. sequential group-buying mechanisms

• Autores: Ming Hu, Mengze Shi, Jianhua Wu
• Localización: Management science: journal of the Institute for operations research and the management sciences, ISSN 0025-1909, Vol. 59, Nº. 12, 2013, págs. 2805-2822
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper studies the design of group-buying mechanisms in a two-period game where cohorts of consumers arrive at a deal and make sign-up decisions sequentially. A firm can adopt either a sequential mechanism where the firm discloses to second-period arrivals the number of sign-ups accumulated in the first period, or a simultaneous mechanism where the firm does not post the number of first-period sign-ups and hence each cohort of consumers faces uncertainty about another cohort's size and valuations when making sign-up decisions. Our analysis shows that, compared with the simultaneous mechanism, the sequential mechanism leads to higher deal success rates and larger expected consumer surpluses. This result holds for a multiperiod extension and when the firm offers a price discount schedule with multiple breakpoints. Finally, when the firm can manage the sequence of arrivals, it should inform the smaller cohort of consumers first.