Resumen de Acting 'of one's own free will': : modern reflections on an ancient philosophical problem
Over the past five decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which it requires that agents be to some degree ultimately responsible for the formation of their own wills (characters, motives and purposes). To act �of one's own free will� in this sense is to act �from a will� that is to some extent �of one's own free making�. A free will of this ultimate kind (often called �incompatibilist� or �libertarian�) has been under attack in the modern era as obscure and unintelligible. In this paper, I discuss the arguments for such a view and compare it to other contemporary views of free will and action. I then address criticisms that such a non-determinist free will cannot be made intelligible or reconciled with modern science, does not allow sufficient agent control, reduces to mere chance or luck or randomness, leads to various regresses, or fails to account for moral responsibility, among other criticisms.
