Integrating the non-rational soul

• Autores: Jonathan Lear
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 114, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 75-101
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which the parts of the soul, rational and non-rational, can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in, he faces Bernard Williams's charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper examines the problem and proposes a way forward, namely, that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the resources for the development of a satisfying Aristotelian moral psychology.