Most current anticorruption strategies presume the former, which is why institutions from developed and well-governed countries are currently being copied all around the world. At least on paper, there are few states left that are missing a constitutional court, some form of checks and balances, or an ombudsman. More recently, following the failure of the first generation of anticorruption reforms, a middle-ground position has begun to emerge: that the most relevant lessons lie not in what developed countries are currently doing to control corruption but rather in what they have done in the past, when their societies more strongly resembled the conditions in today's developing world. The main research question addressed in this paper is how control of corruption has been built historically and what lessons we can derive from this for current anticorruption policies. Corruption is defined here not at the individual level -- undue profit from abuse of public authority -- but at the societal level, as a governance regime.
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