A problem for the unity of normativity

• Autores: Nicholas Shackel
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 74, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 404-411
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A prevalent assumption is that normativity is a unity. In this paper I argue against this assumption by demonstrating the problems it poses to a well known answer to a well known problem for taking rationality to be normative. John Broome's normative requirement relation does indeed avoid that problem, but insofar as the relation is supposed to offer a general characterisation of the normativity of rationality, it fails. It fails because it cannot capture an important aspect of the normativity of rationality, that it is available to guide us. I show that if we distinguish two kinds of normativity it need not fail in this way.