The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the core general principles of heterodox political economy � especially with an institutional and evolutionary emphasis � to the topic of corruption as a global, regional, and national phenomenon. I start with the principle of historical specificity, where the known history of corruption processes and concepts are examined. I follow the evolution of the corruption discourse, starting with the classical scholars of ancient Greece and numerous others, who had a systemic view of the matter. I proceed through the micro-views of Roman law, to Adam Smith and others who took an individualist view of corruption, and onto the reemergence of the corruption discourse in the period between the 1970s and the 2010s. In the process, I investigate the micro-perspective, but increasingly center on the "modern classical works" on systemic corruption. Then, I present the basics of a modern institutional and evolutionary perspective on corruption through the principle of contradiction, which defines corruption as the promotion of vested interests against the common good in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, state capture, nepotism, extortion, and others. Social dominance theory is applied to corruption vis-à-vis dominant and subordinate groups, and the styles of corruption activated by elites are surveyed as they gain resources, favors, and economic surplus against the interests of "common people." Finally, I scrutinize the principle of uneven development, paying special attention to four main stylized facts about corruption throughout the world in relation to (i) development patterns, (ii) corporate corruption, (iii) key sectors/nations, and (iv) inequality. Throughout the paper, I outline ways to reduce corruption and modify the structure of power to benefit the common good, socioeconomic performance, and the functioning of institutions.
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados