Interpersonal self-consciousness

• Autores: Christopher Peacocke
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 170, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 1-24
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.

    The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more sophisticated states of which humans are capable. First person content can be present in the perceptual states of a creature capable of representing only some of its physical states and its relations to the physical environment, and not capable of representing anything beyond that. So the first distinction is between this minimal case, and richer varieties of self-consciousness. Some writers use �self-conscious� to apply to a subject who is in any mental state involving first person content, and so they would appl.