Speaks on strong property representationalism

• Autores: Michael Tye
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 170, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 85-86
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or �sensible profile� represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:

    Let �RED� stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.

    �(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).

    �(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.

    Hence, �(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.

    Since (3) is false, (1) is false too.

    (3) Follows from (1) and (2) only on the assumption that what it is for something to have a phenomenal character is for it to instantiate a certain property just as what it is for my pen to have the color red is for it to instantiate the property of being red. The property instantiation model of having a phenomenal character is not the only possible model, however, and I reject it.