Thought experiments and the problem of deviant realizations

• Autores: Thomas Grundmann, Joachim Horvath
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 170, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 525-533
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one major objection to interpreting our judgments about Gettier cases as strict conditionals.