VII-The significance of self-consciousness in idealist theories of logic

• Autores: Robert Pippin
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 114, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 145-166
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Among Kant's innovations in the understanding of logic (�general logic�) were his claims that logic had no content of its own, but was the form of the thought of any possible content, and that the unit of meaning, the truth-bearer, judgement, was essentially apperceptive. Judging was implicitly the consciousness of judging. This was for Kant a logical truth. This article traces the influence of the latter claim on Fichte, and, for most of the discussion, on Hegel. The aim is to understand the relations among self-consciousness, reason and freedom in the idealist tradition.