Constructive methodological deflationism, dialetheism and the Liar

• Autores: David Liggins
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 74, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 566-574
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the �constructive methodological deflationism� put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that it does not, and I show that it in fact provides a classical response to the Liar paradox.