Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism

• Autores: Penelope Mackie
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 74, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 593-603
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful.