What�s the matter with epistemic circularity?

• Autores: David James Barnett
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 171, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 177-205
• Idioma: alemán
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source�s reliability by appealing to that source�s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source�s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source�s testimony on the matter of that source�s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity�bootstrapping and self-verification�I argue for a qualified version of the claim that there is nothing especially illegitimate about using a questionable source to evaluate its own reliability. Instead, it is illegitimate to appeal to a questionable source�s testimony on any matter whatsoever, with the matter of the source�s own reliability serving only as a special case.