Enfranchisement, Malapportionment, and Institutional Change in Great Britain, 1832�1868

• Autores: Christopher Kam
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 39, N. 4, 2014, págs. 503-530
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article examines why after 35 years of repeatedly rejecting the secret ballot, the British House of Commons enacted it with the Ballot Act of 1872. Drawing on roll-call votes, I show that parliamentary opposition to the secret ballot was invariant between 1832 and 1867. In 1867, however, the Second Reform Act significantly extended the electoral franchise and substantially redistributed parliamentary seats; the House elected immediately following these changes to pass the Ballot Act of 1872. I show that a key reason for the change in the House's attitude on the ballot was that anti-ballot MPs whom the redistribution threatened to expose to electoral competition were disproportionately likely to retire prior to the 1868 election. These results imply that it was the anticompetitive effects inherent in the gross malapportionment of the older electoral system rather than the restricted nature of the franchise that insulated MPs from public pressure and kept parliamentary opinion on the secret ballot in stasis. This is a useful lesson because while almost all modern democracies operate on a universal adult suffrage, many continue to be marked by significant malapportionment.