�Professionals who understand�: : Expertise, public interest and societal risk governance

• Autores: Philip O�Regan, Sheila Killian
• Localización: Accounting, organizations and society: an international journal devoted to the behavioural, organizational and social aspects of accounting, ISSN 0361-3682, Vol. 39, Nº. 8, 2014, págs. 615-631
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper applies ideas from Beck, Power and Collins & Evans to investigate why crises triggered by societal risks heighten tension between self-regulated experts and the state, and why this increased tension threatens professional self-regulation. Using an Irish case of the regulation of professional auditors, we find that Beck helps us to understand the accounting bodies� view of their own position as experts and their role in mitigating risk. Beck�s idea of a closed organizational roof, Collins and Evans (2002) work on waves of risk and expertise, and Power�s insights on the significance of public perception of risk are deployed as a framework to explore why these bodies lost power to a non-expert state which more clearly grasped the importance of lay power in a time of crisis. We propose the idea of professional regulation as a form of societal risk governance; this provides a frame to investigate why the state was able to harness a growing public disquiet to assert more control in their relationship with the professional bodies, and underscores the precedence of public interest over expertise in the self-regulatory debate. An analysis of the perspectives of government, profession and civil society illustrates inherent vulnerabilities in the authority of a self-regulated professional body excessively reliant on its own expertise.