The Weight of Truth: : Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument

• Autores: Tim Button
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 114, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 261-289
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it.