EMU and the EU's Constitutional Framework

• Autores: Koen Lenaerts
• Localización: European law review, ISSN 0307-5400, Nº 6, 2014, págs. 753-769
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 4 Citas
• Resumen

  • The law on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has undergone a dramatic overhaul, the consequences of which are not limited to that specific area of EU law but affect the constitutional balance on which the EU is founded. After providing a brief overview of the reforms carried through, this contribution focuses on two important changes affecting the EU's constitutional framework, namely a new method of action that may be qualified as "semiintergovernmental" co-operation and the creation of European Supervisory Authorities. Next, it evaluates the constitutional implications that flow from these reforms from an institutional, a substantive and a dynamic perspective. Finally, if further integration is the right avenue to pursue in order to avoid new financial crises, it is submitted that new reforms of EMU must be grounded in two main principles, i.e. first, that greater financial solidarity should be made conditional upon compliance with stricter EU rules and second, that the creation of fiscal authority at EU l el requires appropriate democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision-making. In particular, if future reforms grant redistributive powers to the EU, the latter would take political decisions that can only be adopted in a forum where each and every European citizen feels represented.