Misconceptions and game form recognition: : challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing

• Autores: Timothy N. Cason, Charles R. Plott
• Localización: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN-e 1537-534X, Vol. 122, Nº. 6, 2014, págs. 1235-1270
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects� misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.