Building thoughts from dust: : a Cantorian puzzle

• Autores: Joshua Rasmussen
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 192, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 393-404
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I bring to light a set-theoretic reason to think that there are more (identifiable) mental properties than (identifiable) shapes, sizes, masses, and other characteristically �physical� properties. I make use of a couple counting principles. One principle, backed by a Cantorian-style argument, is that pluralities outnumber particulars: that is, there is a distinct plurality of particulars for each particular, but not vice versa. The other is a principle by which we may coherently identify distinct mental properties in terms of arbitrary pluralities of physical properties. I motivate these principles and explain how they together imply that there are more mental properties than physical properties. I then argue that certain parody arguments fail for various instructive reasons. The purpose of my argument is to identify an unforeseen �counting� cost of a certain reductive materialist view of the mind.