Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

• Autores: Caterina Casalmiglia, Chao Fu, Maia Güell
• Localización: Documentos de trabajo ( FEDEA ), ISSN 1696-7496, Nº. 21, 2014, págs. 1-63
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 2 Citas
• Resumen

  • An important debate centers on what procedure should be used to allocate students across public schools. We contribute to this debate by developing and estimating a model of school choices by households under one of the most pop- ular procedures known as the Boston mechanism (BM). We recover the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using adminis- trative data from Barcelona. Our counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Gale-Shapley student deferred acceptance mechanism would create more losers than winners, while a change from BM to the top trading cycles mechanism has the opposite effect.