Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality

• Autores: Otávio Bueno, Scott A. Shalkowski
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 72, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 671-689
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.