What apparent reasons appear to be

• Autores: Kurt Sylvan
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 587-606
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to TeX when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to TeX. On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to TeX when (i) R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to TeX, and (ii) it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views.