On Trojan Horses and revolving doors: Assessing the autonomy of national officials in the European Commission

• Autores: Jarle Trondal, Zuzana Murdoch, Benny Geys
• Localización: European journal of political research, ISSN 0304-4130, ISSN-e 1475-6765, Vol. 54, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 249-270
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • National officials working in international bureaucracies regularly invoke the fear that member states strategically use such officials for influencing decision making and agenda-setting to their advantage. This article theoretically analyses conditions under which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised. The ensuing predictions are then tested using a unique survey among seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (N ≈ 400). Finally, evaluating the characteristics linked to reduced autonomy among SNEs in the Commission, the article illustrates that these officials are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member state influence.