Resumen de Withholding the ace: : The individual- and unit-level performance effects of self-reported and perceived knowledge hoarding
Joel M. Evans, Michael G. Hendron, James B. Oldroyd
This paper investigates knowledge hoarding, defined as an individual’s deliberate and strategic concealment of information, and perceived hoarding, defined as coworkers' beliefs that an individual is engaged in hoarding. We hypothesize that knowledge hoarding increases an individual’s job performance by enhancing bargaining power and influence, whereas perceived hoarding decreases the individual’s job performance because coworkers withdraw social support. We further suggest that knowledge hoarding and perceived hoarding are both detrimental to unit performance because they hurt work-related interactions and impair the unit’s ability to respond quickly to problems. Using a sample of 297 individuals embedded in 41 units in the U.S. Forest Service, we find that the positive effect of hoarding on individual performance is mediated by bargaining power, whereas the negative effect of perceived hoarding on individual performance is mediated by social support. In addition, individual hoarding and perceived hoarding both diminish unit performance. Collectively, our results reveal the mixed fortunes that befall individuals and their organizations as a result of knowledge hoarding and suspected hoarding activity.
