Decision bias in capacity allocation games with uncertain demand

• Autores: Yefen Chen, Xiaobo Zhao
• Localización: Production and Operations Management, ISSN-e 1937-5956, Vol. 24, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 634-646
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Existing studies on capacity allocation games have demonstrated that the standard Nash theory exaggerates retailers' tendency of ordering more than they need in the situation of supply shortage. Adding to the results in the literature, our experimental study with consideration of demand uncertainty demonstrates that the standard Nash theory also exaggerates retailers' tendency of telling the truth in their ordering strategy. To account for these systematic biases, based on the quantal response equilibrium framework, we develop a behavioral model with different mental weights on the underage and overage costs to characterize a retailer's perception bias regarding a critical fractile. Based on the parameter estimates, we show that retailers perceive the critical fractile as being closer to 0.5 than it is, and the perceived critical fractile increases over time. Such empirical evidence of retailers' behavior in capacity allocation games can be valuable, for example, in the mechanism design of coordination and in improving supply chain performance.