I—Rights against harm

• Autores: Jonathan Quong
• Localización: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, ISSN-e 1467-8349, Vol. 89, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 249-266
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Some philosophers defend the fact-relative view of moral rights against harm:

    Whether B infringes A's right not to be harmed by ϕ-ing depends on what will in fact occur if B ϕs. B's knowledge of, or evidence about, the exact consequences of her ϕ-ing are irrelevant to the question of whether her ϕ-ing constitutes an infringement of A's right not to be harmed by B.

    In this paper I argue that the fact-relative view of moral rights is mistaken, and I argue for an alternative view whereby our rights against harm depend on what we can reasonably demand of others. I illustrate the importance of this conclusion with a discussion of liability to defensive harm.