A problem for predicativism solved by predicativism

• Autores: Delia Graff Fara
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 75, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 362-370
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • John Hawthorne and David Manley say that the difference between these two sentences raises a problem for Predicativism about names. According to the currently more standard version of Predicativism, a bare singular name in argument position, like ‘John’ in (2), is embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. The problem is supposed to be that (1) permits a covarying reading that allows for different races to have been won by different colts, while (2) does not permit a covarying reading—it can be true only if there is a single John that won every race. But, the objection runs, if the name ‘John’ is really embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article, then the two sentences are structurally parallel and should not differ with respect to covariation. Appealing to Jason Stanley's ‘Nominal Restriction’ (the 2005 version), I show that the difference between the two sentences above not only does not raise a problem for Predicativism but also is actually predicted by it.