Fallibility and trust

• Autores: Sven Rosenkranz
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 49, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 616-641
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far-reaching consequences for our account of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence