Somehow things do not relate: : On the interpretation of polyadic second-order logic

• Autores: Marcus Rossberg
• Localización: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN-e 1573-0433, Vol. 44, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 341-350
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Boolos has suggested a plural interpretation of second-order logic for two purposes: (i) to escape Quine’s allegation that second-order logic is set theory in disguise, and (ii) to avoid the paradoxes arising if the second-order variables are given a set-theoretic interpretation in second-order set theory. Since the plural interpretation accounts only for monadic second-order logic, Rayo and Yablo suggest an new interpretation for polyadic second-order logic in a Boolosian spirit. The present paper argues that Rayo and Yablo’s interpretation does not achieve the goal