Remittances and democratization

• Autores: Abel Escribáa Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, Joseph Wright
• Localización: International Studies Quarterly, ISSN-e 1468-2478, Vol. 59, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 571-586
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships