Resumen de Internal or External Grounds for the Nontransitivity of “Better/Worse than”
In his book Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of PracticalReasoning Larry Temkin contrasts two views of ideals for evaluating outcomes:the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View. He claimsthat the latter view can make the relation of being better/worse than all thingsconsidered nontransitive, while the former can’t. This paper argues that theInternal Aspects View can also be a source of nontransitivity. The gist of theargument is that perfect similarity as regards supervenient properties, likevalue, is compatible with differences as regards their subvenient propertiesand that it’s logically possible that such sets of insufficient differences add upto differences that are sufficient for supervenient differences. Thus, perfectsimilarity or identity is nontransitive as regards the supervenient property ofvalue, and this implies that the relation of being better/worse than all thingsconsidered is also nontransitive.
